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Foreword
Edward S. Adams
It is 7:12 a.m. You have been warming up and stretching
your muscles for the past thirty minutes. You have been to the
driving range to hit twenty warm-up balls. You have spent time
on your short game and practicing your putting. Now, you stand
on a slight plateau some eighteen to twenty feet above the fairway. Behind you, the sun is rising at your back. In the distance,
some 412 yards slightly to the left, is the flag. Your goal is simple-to put the ball in the hole marked by the flag with a score
of par or less. If you succeed, the others in your foursome will
praise you. If you fail, and do so repeatedly, they will designate
you a "hacker."1
At last, your moment has come. After a deep breath, you
swing the club effortlessly, the ball explodes off the club, and
hurtles down the fairway. After a flight of 260 yards, it comes to
rest slightly to the right of the center of the fairway. Moments
later, after everyone in your foursome has teed off, you stand
with an eight iron in your hands and stare at the green. Once
again you swing effortlessly and the ball lofts through the air,
landing on the green, to the left and a mere fifteen feet downhill
from the cup. You then confront the tricky task of a downhill
putt. Strike the ball too softly and it will not reach the hole. Be
too firm with your stroke and the ball will roll by the hole. You
gently tap the ball and it rolls every so slightly by the hole. You
tap the ball again, and this time it stops short of the hole. Finally, two brief taps later, the ball unceremoniously falls into
the hole. After doing everything right with your first two swings
you end up with a disappointing double bogey, your score devastated by a simple misreading of the green.
Now, imagine yourself at the office on Monday morning.
You have been working on a multi-million dollar transaction for
the past two months. Pursuant to the transaction, your client
will lend $250,000,000 to Corporation X and take a security in1. Being a "hacker," of course, does not have a negative connotation in all
settings. Computer "hackers" are often praised for their considerable skills,
although scorned for their often questionable activity.
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terest in all of Corporation Xs existing and after-acquired inventory and equipment. To perfect your client's security interest in
the collateral, you must file financing statements in fourteen
state and county offices. As you determine, some offices require
payment of the filing fee by cashier's check, others require a certified check, and some allow you to draw off of a prepaid account
maintained at the appropriate office. Moreover, some of the offices allow you to use a standard UCC-1 as the appropriate financing statement form while others require you to type in the
relevant information on their special state form, which the office
can then optically scan. Finally, even after you make the filings,
you know you will have to remind your client to monitor carefully its collateral so that the debtor does not move it out of
state, thereby squandering your client's priority.
As you have repeatedly told your client since negotiations
for the loan began, your client's financial safety depends on making sure you do all the little things right at the filing level so
that you perfect your security interest ahead of all other interests in the same collateral. Indeed, as you tell your client, the
loan documents may be perfect, but if you make a mistake in
filing, your client will lose in bankruptcy to a bankruptcy
trustee 2 and will be fortunate to recover ten cents on the dollar
for its loan. As you inform your client, of the $450,000 in total
attorney fee loan documentation costs in connection with the
loan, over $25,000 is attributable to the filing system-a nontrivial amount.3
Just as reading the greens is essential for a respectable golf
score so is notice filing a centerpiece of the Article 9 secured
transactions system. Notwithstanding the profound significance
of filing, both the academic literature and the general debate regarding secured transactions law often ignore it. This Symposium addresses those deficiencies by revisiting, and in some
cases reasserting or recasting, the role that the filing system
plays in secured transactions law. To extend the metaphor, just
as golf would be a vastly different sport without the many subtleties and complexities of putting on the green, so too would
secured transactions law be manifestly different without the ex2. An unperfected security interest is subordinate to the rights of a person
who becomes a lien creditor before the security interest is perfected. U.C.C. § 9301(1)(b) (1990). A lien creditor "includes ... a trustee in bankruptcy." Id. § 9301(3). A creditor perfects its security interest, most commonly, by filing a financing statement in the appropriate state or local office. Id. § 9-401.
3. Peter A. Alces, Abolish the Article 9 Filing System, 79 MNN. L. REV.
679, 691-92 (1995).
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isting filing system. The works contained in this issue explore
the underlying filing system's assumptions, the justifications
and purported needs for the system, and revisions that may improve the system's operation. More impressively, those who embark on this explorative task in the succeeding pages constitute
the intellectual core of the raging secured transactions and filing
system dialogue that is occurring as the Drafting Committee
transforms Article 9 in the present revisionary process.
Article 9 is a part of the most successful piece of uniform
legislation in United States history. Wholesale provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code, and, in particular, Article 9, have
been adopted in all fifty jurisdictions and are a part of the curriculum at all law schools. Few practice law today without at least
some understanding of and exposure to Article 9. The body primarily responsible for studying and revising Article 9 today is
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws (NCCUSL). In his piece, Professor Fred H. Miller speculates on the future of uniform legislation generally and on Article 9 specifically. 4 Beginning with the premise that uniform
laws are useful but that federal legislation is undesirable, Miller
contends that only cooperation between NCCUSL and state legislatures will achieve successful, thoughtful, and useful uniform
legislation. Miller rejects the notions that the possibility of federal legislative enactment in the implicated areas, the inevitability of non-uniform amendment, and the sometimes
problematic participatory process render the current uniform
legislative process impractical. In short, Miller admonishes us
to remember that the extension of credit would be costly and
inefficient but for the considerable effort and expertise of those
who participate in the uniform process. To that end, Miller concludes that any speculations about the impending death of uniform legislation are greatly exaggerated. 5
Picking up where Professor Miller leaves off, Judge Nancy
C. Dreher 6 and Vance K. Opperman, 7 president of West Publish4. Fred H. Miller, The Future of Uniform State Legislation in the Private
Law Area, 79 Mni4. L. Rav. 861 (1995).
5. Professor Larry Ribstein has speculated about the demise of uniform
legislation and its replacement by increased use of various choice-of-law provisions. Larry Ribstein, A Theory of Uniform Laws, Address at the Faculty Workshop Series at George Mason University School of Law (Spring 1993) (on file
with author).
6. Nancy C. Dreher, One Judge's View of the Uniform Commercial Code in
Bankruptcy Court: Why It Doesn't Work the Way You Thought It Would, 79
MwN. L. Rv. 777 (1995).
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ing, urge us to consider the impact of the uniform commercial
code and the filing system on both judicial decisionmaking and
the economy. Judge Dreher's observations are particularly useful because bankruptcy judges such as herself author so many of
the judicial decisions discussing, considering, and interpreting
Article 9.8 She, in a way unlike anyone else in the Symposium,
pays the price for poor drafling or unclear prose. Ambiguity, an
unavoidable consequence of any legislative drafting, haunts and
affects her work. Reviewing the nine uniform commercial code
opinions she has authored in her seven years as a bankruptcy
judge, Judge Dreher makes clear that true uniformity comes at
two levels: in drafting and adoption and in interpretation. As
she concludes, uniformity in interpretation follows from careful
draftsmanship, both in the Uniform Commercial Code and its
Comments.
Opperman is the harbinger of a different message. An active participant in the Clinton Administration's quest to build a
National Information Infrastructure (NI), Opperman suggests
that the NII provides a unique opportunity to strengthen the
business sector by revolutionizing the way we file and track commercial filings. Noting that electronic commercial filing affords
the advantages of speed, reduced costs, uniformity, and the possibility of a broader range of filings, Opperman reminds us of the
tangible benefits that a uniform, national, electronic filing system may create. Opperman also observes that any changes that
are made in Article 9 are not undertaken in a vacuum, but
rather are subject to other rapidly evolving developments in our
society.
Many of the authors in this Issue agree that the current system is fundamentally sound but requires some revision to accommodate either recent technological developments or to cure
identified or perceived glitches in the system's present operation. In an article 9 that commentator Dean Robert E. Scott
notes marks the transformation of Professor David Gray Carlson from "trenchant, fire-in-the belly, no-holds-barred crit to abstract-modeling, implausible-assuming, game-theorizing law
and economics maven,"10 Carlson persuasively and masterfully
7. Vance K. Opperman, Opening Comments on ElectronicCommercialFilings and the NationalInformation Infrastructure,79 MMN. L. REv. 771 (1995).
8. Dreher, supra note 6, at 778-82.
9. David Gray Carlson, Debt Collection as Rent Seeking, 79 MIN. L. REv.
817 (1995).
10. Robert E. Scott, The Mythology of Article 9, 79 MINN. L. REv. 853, 853
(1995).

1995]

FOREWORD

523

justifies the present system by hypothesizing that because private information and power in the hands of creditors lead to
non-competitive localist credit markets in which local creditors
can capture economic rents, the existence of Article 9 filing is
good because it ties "information disclosure to the retention of
property rights in the security taken by the local creditor."1 1 Article 9 filing thus eliminates the local creditors' positional advantage over national creditors to the benefit of the debtor and
thereby contributes to nation-building and other collective
goods. Accepting that Carlson is right both "normatively and descriptively," 12 Scott, in his commentary, reminds us that Article
9 allows certain classes of creditors (i.e., purchase money secured lenders) to escape the constraints of the first-in-time filing
rules. Article 9 is thus engaged in an internal "tug of war" between the dual goals of eliminating information asymmetries
and providing an efficient mechanism for repeat players-a tension that may be resolved only through the venue of Article 9
politics.
Professor Paul M. Shupack, taking a different approach to
the utility of filing, asserts first that there are substantial reasons to believe that a noticeable number of creditors engage in
lending in which the asset rather than the debtor is central to
the transaction. 13 He then offers reasons to believe that filing
facilitates this type of lending and that such lending constitutes
a significant part of the current American economy. Shupack
also contends that although secured transactions could easily be
explained as an artifact of existing hierarchical capital structures, such an account is incomplete. Accordingly, he maintains
that "[t]he areas in which finance theory does not explain creditor behavior also provide the strongest theoretical basis to believe that" asset-based lending can "be defended on theoretical,
as well as practical, grounds."14
Professor James J. White's article 15 seeks one simple revision to Article 9, a revision that would reduce transaction costs
and improve the overall efficiency of the filing system: "grant
priority to the first to file and ... force others to defend their
11. Id. at 854 (citing Carlson, supra note 9, at 831).

12. Id.
13. Paul M. Shupack, Preferred CapitalStructuresand the Question of Filing, 79 MnmN. L. REv. 787, 792 (1995).

14. Id. at 815.
15. James J. White, Reforming Article 9 Prioritiesin Light of Old Ignorance and New FilingRules, 79 MIN. L. Rlv. 529 (1995).
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right to superiority over the first to file." 1 6 In arguing for a firstto-fie priority system in its purest form, and thus impliedly defending the virtues of the filing system, White contends that
there is little rationale for preserving and defending the rights
and interests of many of those parties who now enjoy priority
over the first to file. As White suggests, those who improperly
enjoy such a priority include: 1) prior parties who made an im17
proper filing that the first to file properly somehow discovered;
2) later claimants such as lien creditors or non-buyers in the ordinary course in the context of future advances by a secured
party; I8 and 3) later claimants to derivative or after-acquired
collateral, such as proceeds.' 9 In conclusion, White urges us to
focus on efficiency as well as fairness in revising Article 9, reus that "fairness to a few often brings complexity to
minding
20
many."

In response to White's article, Professor Linda J. Rusch's
commentary 2 ' questions the fundamental premise that she contends White impliedly advances: that the Article 9 filing system
is, or should be, a race-recording statute. As she indicates, Article 9 in its current manifestation is unlike race-recording statutes used to record transfers of real estate because it neither
provides that a party that has filed record notice is superior to a
party that has not recorded its interest, nor allows a party to
determine the state of title solely from the record. Moreover,
White's desire to make Article 9 conform to the race-recording
model is misplaced, she believes, given the stated mission of the
filing system-"to warn other interested parties that a secured
party might have an interest in the described collateral." 22 She
finds the race-recording model simply inappropriate in the personal property context. Rusch recognizes that there may be
some merit to particular individual initiatives that White proposes, but she suggests that this is not a model of notice filing
that anyone presently has in mind.
Tinkering with the edges of the filing system, Professor
Lynn M. LoPucki advances an incorporation-based system for
corporate filings whereby Article 9 filings against a registered
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
Model
22.

Id. at 535.
Id. at 538; see also U.C.C. § 9-401(2).
White, supra note 15, at 538-39; see also U.C.C. §§ 9-301(4), 9-307(3).
White, supra note 15, at 539; see also U.C.C. § 9-306(3).
White, supra note 15, at 563.
Linda J. Rusch, The Article 9 Filing System: Why a Race-Recording
is Unworkable, 79 MINN. L. REv. 565 (1995).
Id. at 568.
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ornmendations for improving the efficiency of the filing system,
such as eliminating the signature requirement and implementing more systemic filing system innovations. We also recommend requiring state filing office monopolies to reduce their
artificial barriers to entry by providing "private vendors with
complete and timely filing information at a price equal to the
states' costs of obtaining that information." 2 6 Although we recognize the obvious benefits of allowing government a role in the
filing process, we question whether government is the rightful
recipient of filing profits.
Taking issue primarily with our suggestion of creating a
privatized filing system, Professor R. Wilson Freyermuth questions the political feasibility of our proposal. 27 Freyermuth asks
why we anticipate that state legislatures will relinquish control
over these substantial profit centers. Moreover, if the filing system serves a valuable societal function, Freyermuth asks why
we want to create the risk that private entities may at some
point choose not provide a filing service. Finally, Freyermuth
questions how we would achieve uniform technological change
among over fifty widely disparate jurisdictions.
Although many Symposium contributors view the present
system as fundamentally sound, Professor Peter A. Alces urges
us to consider both the benefits and costs of the filing system as
well as any likely benefits and costs of revised systems. 28 Proceeding under the hypothesis that the filing system "should do
no more than we are absolutely certain it can do well: insure a
secured party of a memorandum of collateral interest that will
afford the secured party the priority rights provided by Article
9," Alces advocates a revised filing system in which filing offices
offer assurance that the secured party filing a financing statement has a particular priority claim to a debtor's assets. As he
points out, the primary benefit of this system is that it imposes
any costs of the system's malfunction on the actor in the best
position to maintain the system: the public filing office. In this
have an incentive to "internalize what
way, filing offices would
29
externalities."
are now
In response to Alces's proposal, Edwin E. Smith, a partner
at Bingham, Dana & Gould, contends that Alces overstates the
26. Id. at 931.
27. R. Wilson Freyermuth, Comments on A Revised Filing System, 79
MmN. L. REv. 957, 960 (1995).
28. Alces, supra note 3, at 679-81.
29. Id. at 710.
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(i.e., corporate) debtor would be made in the state in which the
debtor is incorporated rather than the location of the collateral
23
or the debtor, as is the case under the present system.
LoPucki argues that such a modification would reduce transaction costs and lead to greater accuracy. LoPucki also notes that
those who will benefit the most from his system are those filers
and searchers who most value certainty. Under the present system filers are expected to know the correct name of their debtor,
the location of the collateral, and the intentions of their debtor
with regard to that location, as well as to monitor the locations
of their collateral, their debtors, and changes in their debtors'
names. Under LoPucki's revised system, filers need only know
the correct name and state of incorporation of their debtor.
Moreover, they need not monitor their debtor's actions. So long
as the filer complies with this simple requirement, it is guaranteed to have properly filed.
In their reply to LoPucki's work,2 4 Professors Steven L.
Harris and Charles W. Mooney, Jr. acknowledge the difficulties
the current choice-of-law system poses. They disagree, however,
with some of LoPucki's underlying assumptions and question
whether LoPucki's proposal would ever be adopted. First, they
point out that on a number of levels the filing system he advocates may not be as simple as it first appears. For example, accounting for corporations that dissolve, or for the fact that a
"registered entity" may be chartered in more than one jurisdiction, adds complexity. Second, even if these problems prove trivial, as Harris and Mooney concede they might, they argue that
political opposition from filing officers and other state officials
who perceive they might lose substantial revenues to states such
as Delaware make uniform adoption of the LoPucki proposal unlikely. Moreover, as they note, non-uniform adoption could
make it impossible for a filer to determine where to file to perfect
its security interest.
Also touching on the notion of state revenues, and hence the
state role in the filing system, in our piece 2 5 Professor Steve H.
Nickles, Susan Sande, Bill Schiefelbein, and I make specific rec23. Lynn M. LoPucki, Why the Debtor's State of IncorporationShould Be
the ProperPlacefor Article 9 Filing: A Systems Analysis, 79 MINN. L. REV. 577,
581 (1995).
24. Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Choosing the Law Governing Perfection: The Data and Politics of Article 9 Filing, 79 MINN. L. REv.
663 (1995).
25. Edward S. Adams et al., A Revised FilingSystem: Recommendations
and Innovations, 79 MINN. L. REv. 877 (1995).
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costs concerning the present Article 9 filing system and understates those same costs with regard to his proposed system. 30
As Smith suggests, the costs associated with single jurisdictional filings under the present system are significantly lower
than Alces suggests and the costs likely to be incurred in moving
from the current system and implementing the Alces model are
likely to be greater than Alces recognizes. So too, Smith notes
that Alces ignores the benefits of the existing filing system. As
he asserts, the informational benefits of the filing system should
not be ignored; indeed, the frequent requests of parties making
credit inquiries attest to their utility.
In a more sweeping indictment of the existing system, Professor James W. Bowers argues that there is serious reason to
doubt that the filing system advances welfare better than the
market for information acting alone.3 1 He asserts, first, that the
filing system is unnecessary-if the services it provides are really valuable, the market would provide them as efficiently. Second, Bowers asserts that even if the filing system is efficient,
there are persuasive reasons for reorganizing it. Bowers thus
advocates the adoption of a "properly privatized system" which
would, he believes, cure any technological concerns about the iling system by "encourag[ing] those who own the system to adopt
any advantageous technologies, without a legislative
32
mandate."
Professor John D. Ayer and Carl S. Bjerre, a partner at
Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, contest Bowers's conclusions in their respective works. Ayer admonishes Bowers to remember that it is not a government filing system that is the
problem per se, but rather the idea of rent-seeking. 33 Ayer reminds us that before we oppose the government's role in filing,
we should at least inquire into whether the government is the
more efficient provider of the requisite information. If it is, then
opposing the government's role in filing may increase, rather
than reduce, the inefficiencies in the system about which Bowers
laments. Pursuing a different line of analysis, Bjerre argues
that Bowers's proposals would throw out the baby with the bath
30. Edwin E. Smith, Commentary on Abolish the Article 9 Filing System by
ProfessorPeterAces, 79 MINm. L. Rav. 715, 715-17 (1995).
31. James W. Bowers, Of Bureaucrats'Brothers.in-Law and Bankruptcy
Taxes: Article 9 Filing Systems and the Market for Information, 79 MIN. L.
REv. 721, 722-23 (1995).
32. Id. at 734.
33. John D. Ayer, Some Comments on Bowers, 79 Mum. L. REv. 745, 745
(1995).
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water.3 4 Instead of the complete elimination of the filing system, Bjerre recommends that "only the most onerous portions of
existing filing requirements" be altered. 35 He suggests that
these include collateral descriptions, debtor-related details other
than name and address, and certain filer details. He concludes
by embracing Bowers's suggestion that privatization may indeed
make some sense in this area.
This Symposium is a significant first step toward determining if, how, and why the present filing system might, or should,
be revised. Ultimately, of course, just as it is impossible to devise rules that take into account both the desires of all golfers
and advances in golf technology, it may be impossible to produce
a perfect filing system that meets all the goals or objectives assigned to it at a low cost and in an efficient manner. The dialogue contained in these pages, however, brings into focus many
of the issues central to the filing system debate as well as the
competing concerns of both filing system proponents and opponents. In this way, these contributions may very well lead the
way to improvements in the system that serve debtors, creditors, the economy, and society as a whole.

34. Carl S. Bjerre, Bankruptcy Taxes and Other FilingFacts: Comments in
Response to ProfessorBowers, 79 MmNN. L. Rsv. 757, 757 (1995).
35. Id.

